

COSMOGRAPHICS

A NEW DIAGRAM OF MAN IN THE UNIVERSE

by

DOUGLAS HARDING.

Alternative:
THE SCIENCE OF MAN

MAN IN THE
UNIVERSE
A New Diagram



D. E. Harding

OR
MAN IN THE
UNIVERSE

A new Cosmography

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P R E F A C E

This book ^{was begun several} ~~arose~~ ^{years ago. It} arose out of a personal need — a ^{need} ~~need~~ to take stock ^{while there was still} ~~before it was~~ too late, a need to find out just how much & how little I really knew about myself and the world in which I had occurred. It seemed a pity to die before I had had time to be surprised at being alive, or to be actively curious about what man amounted to — if, indeed, he amounted to anything. ^{religion,} ^(to the education immediately dependent on this book —) Though the present book has grown far beyond my first attempts to meet such a ~~personal need~~ ^{need}, it remains what it began as — an effort to answer the question: what am I?

What ^{is man?} ~~is man?~~ This is a ^{problem} ~~question~~ which ^{arises} ~~arises~~ after the ^{own} ~~own~~ fashion. ^{Everyone} ~~Every man~~, ^{accepting} ~~accepting~~ all the ^{outside} ~~helps~~ he can get, ~~the~~ ^{must} ~~must~~ ^{face up to} ~~face up to~~ for himself. My ^{solution} ~~solution~~ (if it can be called that) ^{such as it is} ~~such as it is~~, will not do for anybody else, & it is offered here rather as an incentive than as a guide. ^{Not even for} ~~Not even for~~ ^{myself} ~~myself~~, because, for one thing, this is ^{no complete, self-sufficient, system} ~~not a finished, self-sufficient, system~~, but ^{only the only} ~~only the only~~ ^{philosophy} ~~philosophy~~ of a ^{philosophy} ~~philosophy~~. ^{for another thing} ~~for another thing~~, the subject ^{is so} ~~is so~~ baffling & inexhaustible & full of paradox. ^{its designation is ridiculous} ~~its designation is ridiculous~~. While I can say ^{with} ~~with~~ ^{never know myself} ~~never know myself~~ ^{much less another} ~~much less another~~. Though ^{like} ~~like~~ Thoreau, I ^{say that} ~~say that~~ 'I should not talk so much about myself if I were anybody else I knew as well,' ^{I have to admit} ~~I have to admit~~ that I am increasingly a mystery to myself. There is too kind of madness - those who will take the advice 'know thyself' & those who think they have done so. Knowledge that is not precisely counterbalanced with knowledge of ignorance is no knowledge. It is in asking myself what I am ^{that} ~~that~~, rather than in arriving at any definitive answers, that I have arrived at a philosophy. The expert will find in this philosophy affinities with many doctrines old & new. My indebtedness to writers, philosophical and otherwise, is too extensive to be acknowledged here in detail; the index will give some indication of it.

To P. PP33H

This is a philosophical book, but I must explain without further delay that the word philosophy, as I use it here, is a meaning which is not always accepted nowadays. I suggest lines along which it includes an effort to integrate the main results of the separate sciences into a Science, and it advocates while I agree with Samuel Alexander that "all true & unselfish thought is tied down to nature," I cannot claim that all my "book is a way of life." The philosophy of this book is ^{in a way, holistic} speculative, empirical, ^{may one day, however} synthetic, with an emphasis on the concrete. ^{it includes an effort to} ^{boldly (if not rashly)} ^{boldly so} and practical. It is founded on the belief that we are in desperate need of a world-picture to which our own lives may make a clear contribution - richness of colour & detail ^{which our intellects} ^{unavoidably} for the imagination, with that acceptance of science which the intellect demands, clear discernment of cosmic unity & purpose which alone will satisfy the heart. Such a picture no one man can paint next as to the presentation. I know of no name for it.

Next as to the presentation. I know of no reason why serious books on philosophical themes should not be as easy to read as the subject allows, and pleasant to look at. Accordingly I have tried to write in terms which the educated non-specialist will follow, and I have helped out the text with diagrams, using these in what I believe amounts to a new way. Actually, no doubt, the degree to which the book will turn out to be intelligible will depend ^{more} upon the reader's sympathies & antipathies than upon any other factor. Whether he is or is not a 'visualiser' will make ^{a small} difference. To some the diagrams may be no use — ^{for the sake of such readers} the text has been written so that it can be read without reference to the ~~marginal matters~~ illustrations; ^(I am thinking) almost quote the authorities & Plato) to many I think they ~~diagrams~~, well be as helpful in the reading of the book as they were to me in the writing of it; to a few they will perhaps suggest a new field of interest & research. For this third group there is an Appendix on the subject.

P. The dialogue (between C. or my 'common-sense self,' or P. or my 'philosophical self') shall run throughout their pages, is that my thinking frequently seems to fall naturally into such a shape. "For man," to quote Pascal — "holds an inward talk with his self alone, which it behoves him to regulate well." And in this talk C., though generally worried, is never worried for good, but worries again & again to play an indispensable part. Let me say here, once & for all, that no man — & least of all one who claims to be a philosopher — can do this alone. He must have a sparring partner. Like money, it is invaluable so long as it circulates. It must circulate.

Phaedo, 73, where Cebes says that with new innate knowledge we

till time, the doctor is
 I ~~do not~~ ^{do not} ~~think~~ ^{think} ~~that~~ ^{that} ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~philosophy~~ ^{philosophy}
 & amongst them the
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 according to this book

"In most books, etc.,
or first person, is omitted; in this
it will be retained; that in
respect to position, is the main
difference. We commonly do
not remember that it is
after all, always the first
person that is speaking."
(Walden: Economy.)

that (as Kierkegaard says in his Journals) "in relation to their systems most rationalizers are like a man who builds an enormous castle & lives in a shack close by. He has not need of neither castle nor shack, but a home in the universe. — something between a shlem & an equally unimbalable Dutch pondwer, between the sceptic's lazy chaos & the laborator's brittle shoppiece of the somewhat metaphysical."

'Space, Time & Deity, I, p. 204.'

• "If philosophy is the art of understanding, it is evident that it must begin by saturating itself with facts & methods, & that premature abstraction kills it."

Aniel's Journal, 7th April, 1866.

"For philosophy," says
Arland Ussher, "has now
to give us back, by an act
of transcendental imagination,
the shape & design of the
rational world — the world
of which, through an era of
analysis, she has progressively
rotted & impoverished our
senses; & this task demands
a combination of rational
& religious feeling..."
(Radio Talk recorded in the
Sept 11, 1947.)

c.f. Gelling wood's "Logic of question & answer" (An Autobiography, Ch. V)

Thinking, according to Plats., is a "dialogue of the soul with herself."

We must go forward to new ideas, and back to old ones; we must get down to scientific facts, and up to the facts of science, and up to those of religion. Real progress is expansion in all four directions, not linear, the here-now, but expansion in all four directions. So it seems to me: but nothing I put from this book pretends to finality. I desire to stimulate rather than instruct; to consider certain possibilities rather than to dogmatize.

* Whitehead (adv of 1) p. 142

A hint about reading the book: I warn against dipping in here & there. This can only mislead, because the plan of the work is roughly dialectical. The findings of earlier chapters are modified later on, and later chapters need the backing of earlier ones if they are to be understood.

Taken by itself, no part is valid. You will be many things & know it is a tall order, but I shall not be read — or at least those sections which are not marked with an asterisk. I form no judgment concerning these things until they have read all. "I don't let me say that."

* Ethics II, xi.

Finally, I carry no stock of patent medicines or labour-saving devices. I can offer no easy way out or in, no brand-new gospel, no cult. I can promise are some ancient teachings in modern dress — teachings that are difficult because they are simple — and some old recipes for living even more precariously and uncomfortably than we live at present. It was Keats who described himself as "writing at random, straining at palates of light, in the midst of a great darkness, without knowing the bearing of any one assertion, of any one opinion," — it would be as difficult as they are, and very much higher.

Even so, there is a certain highly cultivated type of mind to whom much of what I have to say will remain meaningless. I know the value of this type of mind that has no use for speculation; it is the intellectual ascetic, with his patient attention to detail & his refusal to go beyond the evidence, I owe the facts on which I base the conclusions.

* Letter to his brother + sister, Feb 14, 1819.

At least I can suggest to him is that our attitudes are complementary — then is as deep & as practical as this. I have failed in it, now the alternative.

a need for speculative structures as for their building materials: And there is another type of mind to whom much of what I say will be all too acceptable. I refer to the lazy-minded & intellectually undisciplined, followers of cults, who is not prepared for the long grind of thinking his way, through the facts, to the goal of his desire.

* "The man who criticizes others must have something as an alternative. To criticize without an alternative is like using fire to put out fire. He (idea) the man who is logically indefensible." Mo Tzu Book XVI. p. 56.

Of these two attitudes, give me the first: at least it has industry, patience, & humility. By all means, I say, let there be speculation — without it man is less than human — but let it be informed speculation.

I know how far & how short the saying of Heraclitus that "men that love wisdom must be acquainted with very many things indeed," said Heraclitus, & as the things multiply, so does the need for ignoring irrelevant details. All I can claim is that I have gone after the truth, not after a naturalistic dogma, not after a metaphysical dogma.

In particular, I have worked & written in the belief that, in modern science, philosophy has a most needful part to play. It is not a luxury, it is not a mere intellectual game, it is a necessary part of the growth of the human mind.

While it is true that the task of this century is to "spiritualize science," it is not just as necessary to attempt a science of the spiritual: in both philosophy is its agent, & her work of unity is as gigantic as it is inspiring.

* Burnet: Early Greek Philosophy, p. 137.

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This book was begun several years ago. It arose out of a ^{public crisis & a private need} ~~personal need~~ — a need to take stock while there was still time, a need to find out just how much & how little I really knew about myself & the universe in which I had somehow occurred. It seemed a pity to die before I had had time to be surprised at being alive, or ~~to~~ actively curious about what man amounted to — if, indeed, he amounted to anything. Though the present book has grown far beyond my first attempts to meet such a situation, still it remains an effort to answer the question: What am I?

What is man? This is the puzzle which everyone, while accepting all the outside help he can get, ^{or use,} wrests after his own fashion. My solution (if it can be called that) will not in its entirety do for anybody else, & it is offered here more as an incentive than as a guide. ^{I have} ~~There is~~ no complete, self-consistent, well-rounded system, but only the sketch-plan of a philosophy. ^{The nature of man} ~~Human nature~~ is a baffling & inexhaustible topic, & dogmatism is ^{out of place here.} ~~about~~. While I can say with Thoreau, "I should not talk so much about myself if there were anybody else I knew as well", I have to admit that I am increasingly a stranger to myself. Of the two kinds of men — those who refuse to take the advice 'know thyself' & those who imagine they have done so — the second is the sillier. Knowledge that is not counterbalanced with knowledge of ignorance is ^{mere} dead weight.

This is a philosophical book, but to ^{prevent} ~~make~~ ^{misunderstanding} I must explain at once that the ^{term} ~~philosophy~~ as I use it has a meaning which is not always accepted nowadays. ^{Firstly,} I avoid as far as possible the metaphysics which, remote from the urgent details of nature, ~~lose~~ ^{lose} ~~itself~~ ^{itself} in words. ^{Paulsen defined philosophy as the sum of} scientific knowledge, or an attempt to unify the sciences. My intention is not so ambitious, but I do wish to suggest lines along which the results of the separate sciences may one day coalesce into a Science. Philosophy is apt to go on, William James remarked, as if the actual peculiarities of the world were irrelevant. "But they cannot be irrelevant"; and the philosophy of the future must ^{include} ~~imitate~~ the sciences in taking them more & more elaborately into account." Secondly, this book is a practical ^{endeavour} ~~enterprise~~, & amongst them the greatest, have held that philosophy is much more than thinking about the important things: it includes & demands appropriate ways of behaving. Thirdly, this book is boldly — not to say rashly — speculative. While I agree with Samuel Alexander that ^{"all"} ~~"the"~~ true or concrete thought is ^{led down to nature} ~~led down to nature~~, I dare not claim ~~that~~ ^{that} all my balloons are captive ones. Some of them sail off into the blue. ^{But is not} ~~the~~ ^{view from above,} the reddest perspective, ^{life is to be} ~~life is to be~~ ^{known while?} ~~known while?~~ Kierkegaard's ^{most} ~~most~~ optimizers are like a man who builds an enormous castle & lives in a shack close by. ^{Our real need} ~~Our real need~~ is neither castle nor shack, but a home in the universe — something between a ^{house} ~~house~~ & an equally uninhabitable ^{front} ~~front~~ ^{parlour,} ~~parlour, something ^{between} ~~between~~ the sceptic's ^{large} ~~large~~ ^{chaos} ~~chaos~~ & the elaborate but brittle ^{exhibits & draughtily constructions} ~~constructions~~ of the armchair metaphysician. I believe we are desperate for lack of a world-picture in which our own lives find a well-marked place — a picture with enough richness of colour & detail to fire the imagination, with that ^{conformity to} ~~unpleasant~~ acceptance of science which ^{any robust} ~~the~~ intellect demands, & with that clear portrayal of comic unity & purpose which alone will satisfy the heart. This book is the ^{rough} ~~cartoon~~ of such a picture.~~

Next as to the presentation. I know of no reason why serious books on philosophical themes should not be as easy to read as the subject allows. Accordingly I have tried to write in terms that the educated non-specialist will follow, & I have helped out the text with many diagrams, using them in what I believe amounts to a new way. Actually, no doubt, the intelligibility of the book will depend ~~with~~ ^{more} ~~depend~~ ^{depend} more upon the reader's sympathies & antipathies than upon any other factor. Whether he is or is not a visualizer will also make a difference. To some the ^{graphic method is more hindrance than help} ~~diagrams may be meaningless~~ — for the sake of such readers the text has been written so that it can be read without reference to the diagrams; to ^{other} ~~many~~ ^{diagram} ~~they~~ ^{may perhaps prove as help-} ~~ful~~ ^{ful} in the reading of the book as they were to me in the writing of it; to a few they will possibly suggest a new field of research. For this third group I have written an appendix on the subject. The names for the dialogues ^{between} ~~between~~ ^{my} ~~my~~ ^{unreflecting or} ~~unreflecting or~~ 'Common-sense self' (C) & my 'philosophical self' (P) — which are scattered throughout their pages, is that thinking naturally falls into such a shape. ^{Thought} ~~as~~ ^{as} Plato said, is a dialogue of the soul with herself. "For man" — to quote Pascal — "holds an inward talk with his self alone, which it behoves him to regulate well." And in this inward talk C, though often ^{by P,} ~~often~~ ^{is} ~~is~~ ^{never} ~~never~~ ^{worsted} ~~worsted~~ ^{for good,} ~~for good, but ^{must} ~~must~~ ^{revives} ~~revives~~ ^{again & again} ~~again & again to play an indispensable part. Let me say here, (once & for all, that no man, ^{at least} ~~at least~~ of all a philosopher, can afford to disown this ^{hopelessly} ~~unphilosophical~~ ^{side} ~~side~~ of himself.~~~~

A hint about reading the book: I ^{must} ~~warn~~ ^{warn} ^{against} ~~against dipping in here & there. ^{Sampling} ~~This~~ ^{can only mislead,} ~~because~~ ^{because} the plan of the work is roughly dialectical. The findings of earlier chapters are modified later on, & later chapters need the backing of earlier ones if they are to be understood. The whole must be read. There will be many things to bring my readers to a ^{real} ~~real~~, but, like Spinoza, "I pray them to proceed gently with me & form no judgment concerning these things until they have read."~~

Even so, there is a certain highly cultivated type of mind to whom much of what I have to say will remain meaningless. I know the value of the mentality that has no use for speculation, for it is to the intellectual ascetic, with his patient attention to detail & his refusal ^{more than an inch at a time} to go beyond the evidence, that I owe many of the facts on which are based the constructions that he endorses as, at best, premature. All I can suggest to him is that our attitudes are complementary, & that there is as deep & as practical a need for large-scale distinctions of thought as for their building materials. Let him allow me my function as I allow his, & when I have fulfilled, ^{let him} ~~show the alternative~~ put me right. As the Chinese philosopher ^{ancient} ~~wisely~~ says, "The man who criticizes others must have something as an alternative. To criticize without an alternative is like using fire to put out a fire."

There is another type of reader to whom much of what I have to say will be all too acceptable. I refer to the lazy-minded & intellectually undisciplined ^{unthinking, to the cult-monger} ~~followers of cults~~ who, ^{un} ~~is not~~ prepared for the long grind of ^{working} ~~thinking~~ his way through the stubborn facts, ^{tries to leap} ~~to the goal of his desire~~, ^{work while} ~~but~~ ^{gains advances} ~~sees them at a single bound~~ ^{on} ~~nothing~~ ^{is} ~~is~~ ^{achieved} ~~without~~ ^{without} industry, patience, & humility. Let there be speculation — without it man is ^{scarcely} ~~less than~~ human — but let it be informed speculation. ^{He} ~~repeating~~ ^{repeating} of Heraclitus that "men that love wisdom must be acquainted with very many things indeed" is ^{more to the point} ~~not~~ ^{now} ~~than~~ ^{ever} it was. Dr. F. Sherwood Taylor ^{states not} ~~states not~~ ^{undersundamental} ~~undersundamental~~ ^{lasts} ~~lasts~~ when he writes: "The only hope for the world is the incorporation of the religious, philosophical, & scientific outlooks in a single comprehensive view, & I would say emphatically that this incorporation has not been accomplished & that its accomplishment is the most immediate & urgent of tasks for those who wish men well." We are ^{the} ~~are~~ ^{victims of} ~~victims of~~ ^{specializations} ~~specializations~~. The scientific jungle needs ^{the} ~~taming~~ ^{hands} ~~of the thinker & the saint~~; on the other hand philosophy can find in the ^{luxuriant growth} ~~abundant~~ ^{pro-} ~~blems~~ of modern science just the food she ^{should feast} ~~needs~~ for further growth, & religion can find in it a much-needed purgative & tonic. Dr. Inge has said that the task of the century is to spiritualize science; it is also (I would add) to intellectualize religion. In both ^{tasks} ~~philosophy~~ has a great opportunity & a great responsibility. ^{The following pages are an} ~~this book~~ ^{attempt to} ~~discharge my own share of this responsibility.~~

Finally, let me ^{emphasize the fact} ~~say~~ that I carry no stock of patent medicines or labour-saving devices. I can offer no easy way out or in, no short cut to bliss, no philosophy without tears, no Land-new gospel. What I can promise are some ancient teachings in modern dress — teachings that are difficult only because they are simple, ^{rather than} ~~rather than~~ ^{some} ~~some ^{old} ~~old ^{recipes} ~~recipes~~ for living even more precariously & uncomfortably than we do at present. ^{The merely new-fangled is} ~~is~~ ^{no} ~~no ^{useful as the} ~~useful as the ^{merely traditional.} ~~merely traditional.~~ ^{We must go} ~~We must go~~ ^{forward to new ideas} ~~forward to new ideas~~ ^{back to old ones} ~~back to old ones; we must get down to the ^{facts} ~~truths~~ of science ^{and} ~~and ^{wake up} ~~wake up~~ ^{to} ~~to ^{the} ~~the ^{door of religion.} ~~door of religion.~~ Real progress is not ^{one-way} ~~not~~ ^{advance} ~~advance~~ from the ^{present} ~~Here-Now~~ into the future, but the ^{expansion} ~~expansion~~ of the ^{Here-Now} ~~Here-Now~~ ^{pastwards & futurewards,} ~~pastwards & futurewards, so that there is in more than transcendence. ^{At least that is one of the possibilities we have} ~~At least that is one of the possibilities we have~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Note on the relation of this inquiry to metaphysics, logical positivism, & science.

What is the ~~proper~~ ^{task} function of the modern philosopher? Logical positivists, ^{dismissing} ~~having dismissed~~ metaphysics as nonsense, ^{and} ~~and~~ ^{another} as ~~another~~ ^{unwarranted} encroachment upon the realm of Science, leave him with very little to do. Professor Ayer writes: "The propositions of philosophy are not factual, but linguistic in character — that is, they do not describe the behaviour of physical, or even mental, objects; they express definitions, or the formal consequences of definitions. Accordingly we may say that philosophy is a department of logic." (57) ^(page 58 Ayer) The view that philosophy is a ^{kind} ~~department~~ of speculative knowledge existing alongside the special sciences is quite mistaken. "Those who make this supposition cherish the belief that there are some things in the world which are possible objects of speculative knowledge, & yet lie beyond the scope of empirical science. But this belief is a delusion. There is no field of experience which cannot, in principle, be brought under some form of scientific law, & no type of speculative knowledge about the world which it is, in principle, beyond the power of science to give." (43)*

Now I do not dispute the value of much of the work that logical positivists have done, or the validity of much of their criticism of metaphysics. ^{indeed, ~~indeed~~} ^{any} ^{right to define} Now, ^{can I object to Mr Ayer's definition of} philosophy ^{in his own fashion,} as a department of logic, ^{except to say that it is,} for me, unnecessarily seems to me to depart from current usage unnecessarily, & therefore ^{to} misleading. ^{Moreover,} it leaves ^{anonymous} ^{that small but not insignificant (I am one of them)} nameless & ~~unaccounted~~ unrecognized a class of persons ^(I know I am one) who are neither scientists, nor metaphysicians, nor logicians, but who take as their ^{subject-matter} province the broad findings of the special sciences & ^{seek to see them as a whole, to overcome their culty across these divisions, seek the larger pattern.} ^{Logical positivists} ^{say (I suppose) that in so far as this, work is really a matter of} ~~say~~ ^{logic} ^{integration} ^{metaphysics} ^(i.e. of meaning) ^{is not a matter of logical analysis (i.e. of philosophy)} ^{proper} ^{in this sense} ^{of the word}, it is the task of science, in which the philosopher has no business to meddle. ~~But~~ ^{Ideally}, perhaps, this is so: T. H. Huxley defined Science as "all knowledge that rests upon evidence & naming", & R. Alex. Hill goes so far as to say that "all intelligent knowledge is science" (MK 775). But ^{I think} ^{clear,} ^{first,} ^{shows no sign of including this work} that it is ~~not~~ ^{clear,} ^{first,} ^{shows no sign of including this work} ^{that science does not} ^{include this task of self-integration;} ^{second,} ^{that scientists, by name of their necessary specialization, are not merely in a position to} ^{think,} ^{that the method of the task cannot not be exact or 'scientific', but must be rambling, speculative, & provisional;} ^{undertake the task;} ^{that,} ^{that the task is nevertheless worth while, & indeed of the first im-} ^{portance.} ^{Therefore I say that, for the present, & until such time as science can take over} ^{(if ever that time should come), there is an need for a} ^{philosophy} ^{which is intellectual} ^{rather than linguistic, in character.} ^{Without such a philosophy, science presents a chaos which is intellectual}

If may, of course, be supposed that there is no work for such a philosophy to do, or that it does not suggest the point which is my answer.

To this objection I can only say: Read this book, before deciding!

While I cannot expect anyone to agree with all that I say, in detail, I do claim to show (1) that new, meaningful & non-antithetical propositions about the universe & proportions which are neither nonsense nor antithetical, & which have an empirical basis can be as forthcoming; (2) that they are capable of suggesting new lines of research in the special sciences; (3) that without such ~~anticipations~~ ^{anticipations} of the sciences is capable of giving birth to new sciences. Let me give one example. I show, in the following pages, that there exist (besides the physical & chemical & biological units of which science now takes account) certain several kinds of objects, concrete, material things, concerning which much empirical evidence exists is available, but which science does not yet recognize.* And the reason why they remain outside the purview of science is that their temporal dimensions are such that they lie beyond the borders of the scientists' field of view: they seem too 'imprecise present' is too small brief to contain them. In other words, they are more extended for him because he does not give them time to exist: he destroys them by dividing their time. Here, then, is work for the philosopher - to discern & to study those numerous orders of (Co-regular psycho-physical) events whose nature science recognizes is that only inasmuch as they 'minimize time' (the time they need to be themselves) is greater than somewhat large.

* Ex. E. G. Wittgenstein,
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus,
The object of Philosophy is
the logical clarification of
thoughts; Bertrand
Russell, Our Knowledge of the
External World, II; A. J. Ayer,
Language, Truth & Logic.

(1946).
Op. cit., p. 57

* ~~Op.~~ A. S. Auer, op. cit., p. 45.

While I keep as close as I can to empirical data in this book, I ~~can~~ ^{cannot} do not altogether reject metaphysics, which discusses the ultimate nature of reality, metaphysical questions. For I believe (1) that all serious discussion (even by ~~that~~ ^{the} logical positivists) unavoidably makes assumptions about the ultimate matters, which assumptions had better be frankly admitted; (2) that though the nature of the most comprehensive or least comprehensible aspects of the universe is obscure, the intermediate aspects do provide curves which may be extrapolated (after the manner of St. Thomas' analogia entis) to yield reasonable hypotheses; (3) that laws ordinarily called 'transcendent' or 'metaphysical' or 'unlawlike' are accessible when empirical investigation shows its extent, the workings of the ~~fundamental~~ ^{primary} forces (particularly when they unite in the logic) to make discoveries which are not wholly uncommon, or which are verifiable by means who qualify themselves for the work: naturally and rationally intolerable. ~~the~~ ^{it is} ~~with~~ ^{undoubtedly} ~~the~~ ^{that} empirical sciences self-imposed ~~limits~~ ^{limits}. ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~common~~ ^{assumes} assumption that the intellect alone is the only truth-getting instrument is more dogmatism which now counts to the empirical sciences.

*Mr Ayer's claim "that material things are reducible to sense-contents" (p. 69) would be unacceptably if he were to recognize that 'sense-contents' are relative to the observer & his spatio-temporal field, & that they may not denote the same degree of division of the contents makes all the difference if the work is what they are.
If we look upon 'sense-contents' as of one order or level (a one spatio-temporal order) only, is a disastrous oversimplification, & one observer's 'sense' becomes another's 'nonsense'. Mr Ayer

It is to be hoped, indeed, that science will ^{for some time} ~~in time~~ ^{piecemeal,} ~~later over,~~ the work that philosophy thus begins. ~~Meanwhile,~~ the philosopher must do the best he can. And, after all, this function ~~of his~~ ^{philosophy} - namely, to bring to birth & to rear the infant sciences - is precisely that which the older positivism accorded to philosophy. The only mistake ^{in this respect} ~~of the~~ ^{is now} ~~Conte's~~ ~~made~~ was to suppose that ~~that~~ philosophy ~~was~~ old & past bearing, & that the family of grown-up sciences had ~~now no~~ ^{little} ~~more~~ ^{farther} use for their mother. In the following pages I do my best to show that, on the contrary, she is ~~at once~~ ^{still} the ~~head~~ ^{groom-up} ~~of the family~~ ^{head} ~~without whom the children are practically strangers~~ ^{& often at loss-heads} and the potential mother of ~~new~~ ^{new} ~~children~~ ^{children}.

✓ ~~As~~ The present limitations of science & common sense ~~are such that~~ ^{demand that} philosophy ~~can~~ ^{cannot} should ^{precisely} do what Professor Ayer declares it cannot do — afford "Knowledge of a reality transcending the world of science & common sense" °

[illegible]

* Two other words to
William James, 'celebrated
distinction, the 'thin'
philosophies which are
mainly verbal & ^{entirely}
devoid of empirical
content, & the 'thick'
philosophies which are
the opposite of these,
negate one another.
~~Each~~ The former lack
body, the latter rigour

— obviously the dealer
but that they ~~does~~ a
not hold them

Man is man's A. B. C. / Francis Quarles: 'Hieroglyphics' is.

~~It is an extraordinary blindness to live without investigating what we are.~~

Pascal: Pensées, §495.

~~To understand everything except one's own self is very comical.~~

Kierkegaard: Unscientific Postscript, p. 316.

I will see if I have no meaning, while the houses & ships have meaning.

Walt Whitman: By Blue Ontario's Shore.

Thou all thy days must live,
Thou shalt the quest.

Laurence Housman: The Conquering City

I will confess then what I know of myself, I will confess also what I know
not of myself.

St. Augustine: Confessions, Bk. II, Ch. II.

.....the awful ultimate fact, which is the human being.....

A. N. Whitehead: Religion in the Making, p. 16.

Wonders are many, and none is more wonderful than man. ✓

Sophocles: Antigone, ~~III~~.

If thou desirest peace of mind and true unity of purpose, thou must
put all things behind thee, and look upon thyself.

Thomas À Kempis: Imitation of Christ, Pt. II, Ch. V.

We are the miracle of miracles.

Carlyle: The Hero as Divinity.

The great Pan of old, who was clothed in a leopard-skin to signify the beautiful
variety of things, & the firmament, his coat of stars, - was but the representation
of thee, O rich & various Man! thou palace of sight & sound, carrying in
thy senses the morning & the night & the unfathomable galaxy; in thy brain,
the geometry of the City of God.

Emerson: The Method of Nature.

I felt no doors nor walls in my soul,
No brims nor borders, such as in a bowl
We see. My essence was capacity,

That felt all things;
The thought that springs
Therefrom itself

It acts not from a centre to
Its object as remote,
But present is when it doth view,
Being with the Being it doth note
Whatever it doth do.

Thomas Traherne: My Spirit.

O the riches of their infinite goodness in making
my Soul an interminable Temple, out of which
nothing can be, from which nothing is removed,
& which nothing is afar off; but all things
immediately near, in a real, true, & lively
manner.

Traherne: Centuries of Meditations, I, 92

See, he who is perceived in the water, & he who is perceived in a mirror, who is he?

Chhandogya Upanishad, Khanda 8.

Was somebody asking to see the soul?

See, your own shape and countenance, persons, substances, beasts, the trees, the
running rivers, the rocks and sands.

Walt Whitman: Starting from Paumanok

Everything contains all things in itself, and sees all things in another.

Plotinus: On Intelligible Beauty

In being aware of the bodily experience, we must thereby be aware of aspects of the
whole spatio-temporal world as mirrored within the bodily life.

A. N. Whitehead: Science & the Modern World, p. 113.

Matter is where the concentration of energy is great, field where the concentration
of energy is small.

Einstein & Infeld: The Evolution of Physics, p. 256.

When we see the colours, size, figure, & motions of a man, we perceive only certain
sensations or ideas excited in our own minds; & these being exhibited to our view in sundry
distinct collections, never to mark out unto us the existence of finite & created spirits like
ourselves. Hence it is plain we do not see a man; if by man is meant, that which
lives, moves, perceives, & thinks as we do.

Berkeley.

As a beauty I am not a star,
Then are others more handsome by far.
But my face - I don't mind it
For I am behind it.
It's the people in front get the far.

Quintus in Woodrow Wilson.


There is in the universe an Aura which permeates all things & makes them what they are. Below, it
shapes both land & water; above, the sun & the stars. In man it is called spirit.
Here it is not.

Wên T'ien - Hoang (1)

"Up their heads off?" replied the Queen.
"Yes, heads are given it is proper from Majesty!" the soldiers shouted in reply.

SELF - PORTRAIT

LOOKING AT MYSELF



What am I? That, for every thinking being, is the question.

It is an extraordinary blindness to live without investigating what we are. *Benjamin Franklin*

To understand everything except
one's own self is very comical.

Kierkegaard: Unscientific Postscript

~~I will see if I have no meaning,~~
~~while the houses and ships have~~
~~meaning.~~

Walt Whitman: By Blue Ontario's Shore

Thou art too narrow, wisdom, to comprehend
Even thy self: yea though thou wouldst but bend
To know thy body. Donne: 'The Second Anniversary'


- The Napoleon of Notting Hill, Ch. I.

I am not the only one.

Discartes, recalling the things he holds "true because perceived by the senses," begins
his ~~first~~ ^{one of the earliest} "Meditations": "Firstly, then, I perceived that I had a heart." It is odd that, with all the
world's brains one long fragment of those from the thought-provoking fact that ^{as odd as the fact that} ~~perceived~~ ^{to have his last} and Christian,
paraphrasing the latter-day prophets, completes his list of ^{crazy} future wonders with the final absurdity:
~~the odd, again,~~ men without heads.

"Let them keep off!" shouted the Queen.
"Let them keep off!" shouted the Queen.

SELF - PORTRAIT




It is an extremely interesting
and without mentioning what we
have: London & 1922

It is important to understand that the only way to get a good result is to use the correct technique. The following are some of the most common mistakes made by beginners:

1. 1. The first part of the book is a history of the
2. book, from its origin to the present time.
3. The second part is a history of the
4. book, from its origin to the present time.
5. The third part is a history of the
6. book, from its origin to the present time.
7. The fourth part is a history of the
8. book, from its origin to the present time.
9. The fifth part is a history of the
10. book, from its origin to the present time.

like her own, to be so, writing in the first of paper
concerned with philosophical questions, but is quite certain what it is
writing at my desk writing a note about myself. Common sense is not
fair-ten tell, weighing about eleven stone, & that I am never
any common sense tell me I am a man very much like this



1. The first part of the paper is devoted to a discussion of the
 2. various methods of determining the rate of reaction. It is shown
 3. that the rate of reaction can be determined by measuring the
 4. change in concentration of the reactants or products, or by
 5. measuring the change in pressure or volume of the system.

+ These men with heads (common sense prints out) ~~also~~ report that they are in reality worlds like myself. In that case (I reply) each is everything except that body which he appears to me to be. In other words, he is more or less what I am, except that he has my body & I have his. I do not quarrel with this view, but it can hardly be called a common-sense alternative to the one I am putting forward.

228
The Niagara Falls Hotel

[Faint, mostly illegible handwriting]

The part which perception of ~~parts of~~ one's own body plays in the perception of the direction of objects, has been fully treated in H. Carr's An Introduction to Space Perception. (1935).

Only I have a body that fades out so that the only hints that remain of it above my shoulders are a pair of transparent shadows thrown across the world. (I am in the habit of calling these shadows "my nose", but is a nose a fuzzy thing ^{that} one can see through, that is quite detached from any face, that can be swung from side to side at will? If this is a nose, I have one — or two — of them; if it is not, I have no nose.)

Common sense suggests a simple explanation: the man I cannot see my head is not that I lack one, but that I am looking out of it. A man cannot look out of his window at the street, and at the same time see his own house with the window in it. This inability of his to face both ways, however, ~~is~~ surely does not mean he has no house. In any case, he does glimpse aspects of the house.*

Is common sense's explanation good enough? Where am I, where do I actually spend my time? Do I live inside an eight-inch ball, peering through its pair of portholes? And if I do, has the Ball's lieutenant eyes in his head too, and a lieutenant who peers through them? And so on, endlessly?

No. I am certain I am not shut up in the gloomy interior of
— least of all a head —
any object, living my life there in its interstices. I am at large in the
world. I can discover no watcher here, & over there a thing watched,
no peep-hole, no window-pane, no barrier. I do not detect a
restraining force from such evidence as I can get, like Sherlock Holmes gleaning a client's life history from his watch-
world. ~~It is open to me.~~ Ink marks are forming on this sheet of white
paper. They are present. There is nothing else now but this paper, this
blue & white pattern, no screen here (when I imagined I had a head)
upon which the pattern is projected, no aperture through which it is
glimpsed. There is only the paper & its pattern. My head, my eyes, my
brain — all are a myth. It is incredible that I ever believed in them.

Here, surely, is the biggest Roach, the greatest illusion, the wildest force, ~~that~~ — that a man should be headless & drive himself his condition.

^ How is it that for thirty years and more I had never noticed that between myself and other men there is literally a world of difference? A discovery so startling, once it is seen, ought to have been evident every second of my life from childhood onwards. But in fact even now I realise it with difficulty, & only for a moment at a time. Then back I am again in my old habit, seeing myself as others see me, and as blind as ever I was to the obvious truth that I alone amongst men carry no head upon my shoulders, that I am another species of animal, another order, another class altogether. I am as unlike this thing with a head that I call man as it

[illegible]

I watch (A man shut his eyes, or turns his ^{moment} ~~head~~, or stands on his head, & I cannot detect the slightest change in the rest of the universe.

In J. B. S. Haldane's story called My friend Mr. Leakey, a character, having become invisible, remarks: "Everything looked slightly odd, at first I couldn't think why. Then I saw that the two ghostly nuns which I always see without noticing them were gone." ~~He~~



I felt no doors nor walls in my soul,
No brims nor borders, such as in a bowl
We see. My essence was capacity,
That felt all things;
The thought that springs
Therewith itself. It hath no
other wings
To spread abroad, nor eyes to see,
Nor hands distinct to feel,
Nor knees to kneel;
But being simple like the Deity
In its own centre is a sphere
Not shut up here, but everywhere.
It acts not from a centre to
Its object as remote,
But present is when it doth view,
Being with the being it doth note
Whatever it doth do.

Thomas Traherne:

my Spirit

Ernst Mach (The Analysis of the Sensations,
Anti-metaphysical; The Monist, Vol. 1, p. 57)
makes a drawing that would be as good if, through
his left eye, he saw a frame formed by the sides of his
eyelids; by my nose, & my mouth, & so, appears
that of my body, so far as it is visible, & within the things
I speak about it. But he goes on to speak
as though he had really written along with
this sentence — as though the head & the

pictures have not
compatibles. K. Pearson 59

is possible to be. To give the same name to two such diverse beings is the grossest misuse of language imaginable. I have been properly taken in, & by no one else but myself. What name can I have for thus suppressing the facts about myself?

3. The Head Found.

Common sense cannot let this portrait of myself as a headless body pass. Agreed that there are big differences between myself as I am to myself & myself as I am to others, it remains a fact that in neither case can I do without a head. Or, if I can, what is a headache? And where do all the sensations belong that go with the play of the muscles of my eyes & tongue and face, if not in my head? What does my voice issue from? What do my hands feel?

No doubt common sense is right thus far: that something is going on when I thought I had a head. It is equally certain that this something is not a head. Whatever they are & wherever they are these aches and tastes, and sensations of warmth and cold and pressure, are not furnished with hairs or eyes or ears. They are not spherical or eight inches across. They are quite different from the dictionary definition of a head.*

But, upbraid common sense, I can always reassure myself by looking in a mirror.

So I have found my lost head. But it is not here on my shoulders. It is over there 'in the mirror', and in every reflecting surface within range. Thus, while I have no head in the place where I thought I had one, I have innumerable heads in places where I thought I had none. And these heads have, so to speak, been tampered with: they are twisted back to front; they are all smaller than the head I thought I had; they shrink and swell. I am a decapitated body watched from the middle distance by its missing head, now made elastic, turned round to face its own trunk, and multiplied times without number.

It is true, of course, that I don't find the missing head wherever I look, but that is because it is concealed rather than absent. If I give the thing I happen to be looking at a polish, there is my head in it. I must suppose it was there all the time, and the polishing brought it out. (Is not this farther than the overlooked Freudian explanation of the real point of the story of Aladdin & his wonderful lamp? And are not we, who, as no magic is made for us, but in the polished reflecting surface, the victims of a profounder fascination than Aladdin's?)

Species: group subordinate in classification to genus and having members that differ only in minor details; the or our species: man-kind.

Concise Oxford Dictionary



Head: Anterior part of body of animal, upper part of man's body, containing mouth, sense-organs and brain.....

Concise Oxford Dictionary

* To put the matter bluntly, my tongue is (for me) the taste of things, my ear the sound of things, & nothing more.



Sir, he who is perceived in the water, and he who is perceived in a mirror, who is he?

Chandogya Upanishad, III, 7.

Of the sun & heavens, trees & mountains, as seen in a mirror, Brahmins says: "Which were it not that the glass were present there, one would have thought even the ideas of them absent from the place."

Centuries of Meditations, II, 78.

Common sense ^{interrupts} takes me up here: what about objects that will not take a polish?

Well, a man is such an object. And he will prove to me, in words or in sketches if need be, that he, no less faithfully than my mirror, has my features in their minutest detail, with all their subtle and momentary changes of expression. He has them then where he is; concealed from me, they are open and evident to him. * In fact, the face with which he confronts me is a mask for mine. He cannot take off this mask, but he can tell me what it hides.

Common sense takes me up again: these things that either mirror or are alive, are special cases. The rest, dull and dead things, hide no missing heads. Consider this sheet of paper that lies on my desk: does it contain my head?

Certainly it does. But it contains other things too. If I can keep out these other things by putting a box, with a small hole in it, over the paper, my head will appear on the paper. Now all I have done to the paper is to shield it. I have revealed the presence of my head by subtracting from the paper's condition, not by adding anything to it. Why then should I not say that my head was there all the time, blurred by the other things that were there with it? Pierce a hole in a box, and you have my head trapped inside it — a head perfectly formed, though very likely no bigger than a pea. And your camera cannot play tricks. It exhibits what of me it contains. It does not grasp what is going on elsewhere; it reveals what is going on in the place where it is. If it could report about the place I call here it would, as a camera, be a failure, because its photographs of

me would show me beheaded. * (A notable exception is the device known in the film world as 'first-person camera'. Instead of seeing the principal one of the actors, the audience sees what he sees. In some instances his hands & feet are visible: in other words, the actor with whom the audience identifies itself is a headless body. When well done, the effect is startling in its realism.)

G. Willoughby-Meades Chinese Ghosts & Goblins p. 11.

4.3 My Human Region, and its Centre.

When I am being photographed the camera is in the place where I keep my head. When it moves ^{to location} there the camera has to adopt the peculiarities of that place, of which my head is one. To visit space saturated with my head is to take on my head, in some fashion or other. Not all space is so saturated. An approaching camera comes to places where my head gets bigger & bigger, then to places where my head gets hazier & hazier, & finally to places where I have no head at all — neither camera nor photographs will register it. They have reached my inner headless region. Conversely, when they recede from the centre, they

* An excellent example is the scene in the film *Marie* (Our Excursions, London Films, directed by Marie Curie, having crashed into the jungle, starts out in captivity by Japanese soldiers).

to have visible - but, keep only as it is dragged along

(Often as vampires) flying heads that permeate the visions of several peoples. Cf also Plato's *Timaeus*, 44D.

The beauty that is borne here, in the face, The brain knows not, but commends itself to others' eyes: nor doth the eye itself (That most pure spirit of sense) behold itself, Not going from itself: but eye to eye oppos'd Salutes each other with each other's form: For speculation turns not to itself, Till it hath travelled, & is mirror'd there where it may see itself.

Twelfth & Cressida: III, 3.

* Cf the doctrine of Leibniz, ^{laughed} that the monad has no windows, ^{out on is the} ~~and its outside world~~ ^{needs none,} for it can discover the universe in itself by introspection. Similarly, ~~my premises~~ ^{my premises} is that I can only know what is here: and I find the world here: I cannot, & I do not need to, look through any window to find it. ~~outside.~~




The near side of the box (which is simply a pin-hole camera) has been removed to show the interior.

* According to the *Sou Shien Chi* (a Chinese work of the fourth century AD.) there lived to the north of China a people whose heads could detach themselves from their bodies, & using the ears as wings, could fly to great distances. The tale is told of a certain female slave whose head flew about in this fashion every night, returning to its trunk at dawn. As so often with traditional tales, the underlying idea is as true as the surface details are fantastic.



A Headless Monster (from *T'u Shue Chi Ch'eng*, Sec. XVII, Chiam 27-28) — After G. Willoughby-Meades: *Chinese Ghosts & Goblins*. Cf. O'Helle, Act I, Sc. II: "men whose heads do grow beneath their shoulders."



"Just as a stone flung into the water becomes the centre & cause of various circles, ... so each body situated in the luminous air is spread out circle-wise & fills the surrounding parts with infinite images of itself & is present all in the whole & all in every part." — Except (Leonardo should have added) at the centre itself. X Leonardo da Vinci's Notebooks (trans. McCurdy) p. 56. See also pp. 117, 217-218.

come to regions where I keep my smaller heads. These heads eventually shrink to nothing. Photographs & camera have reached my outer headless region. Here I no longer make my presence felt.

It is as though this mysterious centre which I call myself here were a magician who casts a spell over the surrounding space, whereby visitors ^{all who come hither obey his conditions, & his system of differences is perfect.} entering it are in some degree transformed. ^{magical} This spell, however, is neither arbitrary nor of unlimited range. It works only inside a belt extending from a foot or so to a few hundred yards of the centre, & only ^{near} within the inner rim of this belt is the spell really binding. This is the region that is ~~fully~~ saturated with my head; beyond, the spell thins out to nothing.


After all, then, I am not only a headless man here at the centre; I am also an ordinary man-with-a-head out there, living in the outer world a very odd sort of life — or rather I am innumerable such 'ordinary' men, ^{ghosts & dwarfs & homunculi, cyclopaes, two-eyed, with two arms} ~~men in front view & side view & back view, men viewed from above & from beneath.~~ This is what it is to be a man; my shape a hollow sphere, my size exceeding a whale's, ^{above} my body wide open to all comers, a free-for-all playground. Or, if common sense objects that this spell-bound sphere is not my human shape, but only the region that shape haunts, I ~~would~~ agree; but in that case I am infinite in number, elastic in size, protean in shape. Either way, to be what common sense is pleased to call an 'ordinary' man, a man-with-a-head, is ^{evidently} ~~no~~ ^{or common-sense} simple matter.

But I have only begun to discover the subtleties of this situation I am in. This spell I cast over ^{all} those who enter my human region has the peculiarity that they shall ^{shall} ~~disown~~ its influence, reflecting back on to me at the centre ^{effects} the influences that radiate from me. My friend who tells me how well I am looking this morning can only get his information from the place where he is. But this he denies, claiming that he describes the state of affairs ~~here~~ where I am at the centre. It is no use my telling him that ^{only I am in a position to} ~~he knows what is here~~, ^{& that all he can} ~~do is describe the effect that I produce in him where he is.~~ He will not be persuaded. I have no head here. And, of course, I am equally obstinate about the spell he casts over me. ^{while} ~~It~~ ^{is} true that I register his head because I am where he keeps a head, I am quick to return it ^{to the spot where I think it belongs.} And this I do regardless of the fact that if I were to check my opinion by moving towards that spot I should soon find out my mistake: he would vanish, like the Eurydice when Orpheus turned to make sure of her presence, ^{the world exists because I do not push home my inquiries into his existence; I exist because the world does not insist on me too closely. To look for the self in the self, or for nature in nature, is to find a blank on both. For they exist in each other.} For the division of man from the world is his division from himself, & when he shuts himself up within his own soul, he finds there nothing but emptiness & vanity."

+ The magic circle & its sacred circuit are found in the folklore of many lands. Protection against evil is had, by drawing a circle about oneself to the right; against this the devil dashes wildly (in various guises, but cannot prevail. See J. G. Campbell: Superstitions of the Highlands & Islands of Scotland, p. 247. In this, as in so many other 'superstitions', there is a good deal of sense.



Many philosophers have disagreed with Locke's opinion that a table (for instance) has one real shape, & have held that all the shapes which the table assumes belong to the table: the choice of one of them & its rejection of the rest is ^{entirely} just prejudice. See, for instance, Berkeley: The World as an Organic Whole, p. 126; Berkeley argues from this many-sidedness of things to the 'infinite wealth of content possessed by every object.'



* This activity Lloyd Morgan calls 'proficiency'. "All the objective characters with which a thing is clothed — including but nowise restricted to, its 'out-thinness' — are proficient in so far as they are the outcome, however indirect or mediate, of the relation of the distance receptors of the retina. The hardness, coldness, & slipperiness of a piece of ice; its taste & colour of a strawberry; the beauty of a landscape or of the rainbow which overarches part of it; these are proficiencies proper to the several objects of vision when we see them." (Emergent Evolution, p. 49) • Edward Leir: Hegel, p. 205.

There was a child about forth every day,
And the first object that he look'd upon, that object he became.*

I find they and clouds, trees & houses, furniture, this sheet of paper with its ink-marks; & all of these, though, ^{primarily} ~~they~~ ^{belonging at the centre,} ~~inside~~ ^{with me in some sense,} I scatter as if by a centrifugal ^{machine} ~~engine~~, leaving the centre itself unoccupied, ^{on the other hand,} ~~a blank~~. Then, later myself as I am to others, I discover a ^{of all} ~~countless~~ ^{sorts} ~~host of men~~ ^{shapes & sizes} ~~sort of them~~ ~~mannikin~~; and all of these, though they reside out there, I pull in to me here as if by a centripetal ^{machine} ~~engine~~, leaving not one of them at large in the world. Which of these two pictures, ^(it seems) ~~equally fantastic~~, equally incredible, yet, equally unavoidable, is a true portrait of me?

for me. The gift I need is the power to see myself as I see myself. ⊕

"Unheard of things," says Victor Hugo, "it is within us that we must look for the external. There is in the heart of man a deep - sombre mirror. therein is the terrible chiaroscuro." X

Hence, then, though provisional and incomplete, is a new portrait of ~~himself~~ ^{himself}. It is not what I ~~depicted~~ ^{discovered} in ~~him~~ ^{me}, but what it ~~was~~ ^{is} drawn from life; ~~himself~~ ^{himself} ~~reflected~~ ^{reflected} in ~~me~~ ^{me} what it ~~was~~ ^{is} to

- Though I thus disclaim their objects, I cannot do without them, & any serious change in them upsets me; as Bradley says, their alteration may produce a self-sacrificement that kills me. (Appearance & Reality, p. 80)



* The method of Nature. Nature p 141



• Introduction Russell
Metaphysics, p.1. KEW
31

- Pensin 64

In fact we do so.
We are ~~not~~ ^{not} blind all the while,
the real miracle is when we for
look things over.

of I want to surrender myself to the knowledge that in all the world which ^{this, of all places,} ~~is one spot where I definitely~~
 How would it be to realize that there is one spot ~~where I definitely~~
 am not? ~~that is here? here, namely here, & one spot where I am & I am~~

or a more intellectual puzzle?

become for me a living reality, instead of an occasional insight, & How would it be, while walking along the street, sitting at home, talking to friends, working with colleagues, to realize vividly what and where I am? How would it be to know ~~the~~ all the world ~~is~~ in me and I ~~am~~ in all the world — not

Everything contains all things in itself, and sees all things in another.

Plotinus: On intelligible beauty


"The world that I regard is myself; it is the Microcosm of my own frame that I cast mine eye on Men that look upon my outside, perceiving only my condition & fortune, Fortune, do err in my Altitude; for I am above Atlas his shoulder. The earth is a point not only in respect of the Heavens above us, but of that heavenly & celestial part within us."

St Thomas Aquinas: *Religio Medici* Pt II, XI

5. The View Outwards from the Centre.

Realization does not come for the asking; meantime I can at least fill in some of the details of the new portrait. I ~~shall~~ begin with the view outwards from the centre. What do I find presented for inspection?

I find a world, rich, confused, in a turmoil of change. ^{Within} this wealth of material I succeed in ^{distinguishing} ~~probing out~~ certain relatively permanent objects, ^{which} ~~then~~ I sort out into stars, trees, houses, men, sheets of paper, & what-not. These objects can be arranged according to many types of order, but the type that concerns me now is their order in ^{depth} ~~space~~. Somehow — just how remains to be seen — I am able to ^{sort} ~~arrange~~ objects according to what I call their distance from me here at the centre. Thus I relegate a certain whitish patch to a distance of ^{twelve inches & describe it as} ~~a foot & call it~~ my hand, another to a distance of eighteen inches & ^{describe it as} ~~call it~~ a sheet of paper, another to a distance of a mile and ^{describe it as} ~~call it~~ a cloud. Tonight I shall probably relegate a large number of tiny whitish patches to a distance of many billions of miles. In every instance what is presented here is pushed out, as if by some irresistible but nicely calculated force, to what I take to be its proper station in outer space.



And clearly the nature of the object has much to do with the lengths of its journey. Everything I relegate to a distance calculated in billions or trillions of miles I call a star; everything I relegate to a distance calculated in ^{hundreds of} ~~trillions of~~ millions of miles I call a member of the *Polar System*. ~~A house is a house for me only at a certain range.~~ If a man is to present himself to me as a man he must keep his distance — not too much of it nor too little. If he gets nearer than a few feet

"Reflective perception is a circuit, in which all the elements, including the perceived object itself, hold each other in a state of mutual tension as in an electric circuit, so that no disturbance starting from the object can stop on its way & remain in the depths of the mind: it must always find its way back to the object whence it proceeds"

Bergson: *Matter & Memory* p. 17

See also p. 58, where Bergson speaks of our virtual action upon an object as returned to (or projected upon) the object.

0 Mach, Hering, James, & others have pointed out the "holism" or "wholeness" of sensations. Mach says that "every sensation is in part spatial in character; a distinct totality, determined by its element irradiated, being its invariable accompaniment." Space & Geometry, (Open Court Edn., p. 13.)

A hand-drawn diagram of a target with concentric circles and arrows pointing towards the center. The target consists of three concentric circles. In the center, there is a small cluster of arrows. Several other arrows are drawn pointing outwards from the center, some passing through the concentric circles. The drawing is done in black ink on a light-colored background.

All things to Circulations owe
Themselves; by which alone
They do exist; they cannot have
a sigh, a word, a groan,
A colour or a glimpse of light;
The sparkles of a precious stone,
A virtue, or a smell; a lovely sight,
A fruit, a beam, an influence, a life,
But they another's love must wear.
And borrow matter first,
Before they can communicate

+ This ~~raises~~^{engenders} the important question of
real ownership. To be beautiful is to ~~own~~^{own}
oneself with beauty ~~to~~^{to} make others so, for no woman (being
they) is beautiful in herself. Do I not own
the stars that ~~are~~^{become} stars within me? ~~are~~^{are}
not within themselves? Can a picture,
a face, a building, a poem, a sympathy,
a philosophy, a universe, a God, be
possessed in any other way than by
+ in their enjoyers? Truly I do not
realize in what my wealth lies, + how
lost it is, ^{a how poor I am by} ~~in~~
autobiography (Polemism de Mr. Ver): 'Genius'.

GENIUS

x Intellectual Biography (Postscriptum de Mr. Vie): 'Genius'.

things I can shift in the mass, crudely, in all-or-nothing fashion, but I exercise a more ^{genuine} control over certain ^{few} ~~neaves~~ ^{me}. I ^{am not} indicating the most complex movements of this hand that writes on the page before me, though I have no notion how I do so. * And this same mysterious power of mine, particularly if I have money, ^{to speak} is extended over certain men & certain things so that I can move them very much as I move this hand. (Or so it seems to me - I suppose I should not rule out the possibility that I am merely acquiescing in what is going on.)

It is no use common sense pointing out that these limbs of mine are privileged parts of the scenery, uniquely permanent, uniquely sensitive, uniquely obedient. The line I draw between my body and the world is no more than a convenient fiction, for I am more liable to feel the pinch in my goods than in some portions of my flesh; I have more control over my dog than over my circulation; my brain is a more permanent organ of my life than my hand is. If, then, I have (as I look out from the centre) a body at all, that body is the world. It is the world in the form of 'limbs' radiating from a headless trunk, limbs that ^{as they} become increasingly numb & beyond ^{my conscious} control as they get away from the central here. A very curious body this, vast, magnificent, mysterious. And not the least mysterious thing about it is the manner of my occupation: I sit at the centre, and I pervade the whole. * I exclude it ^{all}, & I include it all. It is me, & it is not me. I belong in all its spheres or regions, even in the furthestmost, but I belong in them as directed towards the centre. I belong at the centre, but I belong here only so long as I am occupied with what is out there.

* If I could cause the sun to describe patterns in the sky that would be no more remarkable than my ability to move my hand, and no more mysterious. By 'the sun' I mean the sun above, for it is easy enough to shift the sun along with everything else.




A = Inner region out of control
B = Region under control
C = Outer region out of control.

* Nicolas of Cusa (in *De docta ignorantia*) laughs that the centre of the universe is just above the observer happens to stand in it: Ptolemy adopted the same doctrine, which is simply the doctrine of regions: I adopt it here because I cannot understand my sense of experience unless I do so.

6. The View Inwards Towards the Centre.

The view outwards is certainly ^{straight} ~~straight~~. Common sense ^{says to} ~~says to~~ that this ^{is} ~~is~~ because I am facing the wrong way, & that if I turn about and look towards the centre I ^{shall perceive} ~~will see~~ that I am not so mysterious & unusual after all, but ^{an ordinary} ~~like the rest~~. (C.S. says so.) ^{like this robe} ~~like the rest~~. Surely it is because I ^{look at} ~~look at~~ ^{my observers' eyes} ~~my observers' eyes~~ the view outwards ^{is arbitrary, formal, & changing} ~~is arbitrary, formal, & changing~~. One moment I embrace ^{a galaxy} ~~a galaxy~~, the next a ^{space of dust} ~~space of dust~~. ^{It is true of me.} ~~It is true of me.~~ ^{whereas the view inwards is constant.} ~~whereas the view inwards is constant.~~ My friends know me in the street. Though I am ^{contemplating} ~~contemplating~~ the Galaxy I am to my tailor what I was while I studied a pinhead. ^{I look at the same} ~~I look at the same~~ and if I didn't, what would save me from dissolving away altogether into the flux of things? It makes no difference to my lat-sign, C.S. ^{points out} ~~points out. Whether I study stars or protea slugs. According to C.S., the view out is ^{the} ~~the~~ accident, the view in is the essence, of what I am.~~



The regional view out: the picture framed by my nose, eyebrows & upper lip, when I write in the country.

is it in fact true that

more or less Is the view in practically constant?

But ~~the~~ I always look ^{more or less} the same? Let me call in a really efficient observer. Here am I seated at my desk, writing. He stands facing me. His description of me tallies with common sense's. But one point of view is not enough. He moves round the room. Every position reveals a new me: there are large discrepancies between back view & front view & side view, not to mention the views from the ceiling & the carpet. Which of these is truly myself — there is an infinite number to choose from — and if they are all true, what becomes of the common-sense portrait? *



The problem is not difficult.

~~But it is in order~~ common sense explains: what the observer does is to combine all these pictures in a composite portrait. I am what I seem to be from every viewpoint.

In that event my observer is free to shift as he pleases, provided he does not take his eye off me here, sitting at my desk. This time, therefore, instead of rotating around me, he retires through the window, into the garden, out into the world. What does he ~~find~~ make of me now?

I lose my shape & I lose my colour.

He finds a man, dwindling. I turn into my house, then my street, then my town. My observer has unlimited travelling facilities. Very soon I turn into England, then the Earth, & eventually into the Solar System. If he still goes on, I become this Unseen, which in the end dwindles to a point of light in Space.

Common sense protests that this will not do at all, & that the only true aspects of me are those which lie near at hand — the nearer the better. Language gives the right idea: to find the truth your inspection must be close & penetrating; you must see into the thing.

My observer takes the hint:

Instead of retiring out of the window, ^{he} ~~the observer~~ approaches me. ^{this time?} What is his story? He finds that I lose my feet, then my legs, then my arms & trunk. My dismemberment is complete: only my head is left. For him I am now a body-less head, just as I am for myself a headless body. ^{I shrink to an eye.} So far he can get along without special apparatus, but for the rest of the journey I must suppose him to have eyes that will enable him to get a clear view of me at a range of inches and fractions of an inch. Thus provided, he continues to draw nearer, and reports that I am several cells, then one cell, then several molecules, then one molecule. ~~He must of the journey~~ The picture is getting increasingly obscure. By some means or other, however, the observer concludes that I am

* In the most general aspect, the principle of relativity means that one 'thing' (a 'world' or 'system') has as many aspects as it has 'observers', and each aspect is true yet unique. Modern physics cannot dispense with or ignore the subject for whom the object exists: & the object-in-itself, apart from any observer, carries no meaning. See Richardson: Spiritual Pluralism, pp. 45ff.



Sc & N.W. 85

Ⓢ Cf. Berkeley: Alciphron,

Fourth Dialogue, §10: Euphrates: Tell me, Alciphron, can you discern the doors, windows & battlements of that same castle?

Alciphron: I cannot. At this distance it seems only a small round tower.

Euphr: But I, who have been at it, know that it is no small round tower, but a large square building with battlements & towers, which it seems you do not see.

Alc: What will you infer from thence?

Euphr: I would infer that the very object which you stretch & properly perceive by sight is not that thing which is several miles distant.




* Like the cockroach who escapes from the kitchen by taking refuge in the shell, my obvious escape from my pursuer by coming here to the only place where it does not exist.

This ~~is~~ ^{rather} obvious is like the Guard in
through the Looking Glass, who "was
looking at this first through a telescope, then
through a microscope, & then through an
opera-glass. At last he said "You're
travelling the wrong way," ~~that~~ & shut up
the windows & went away."

Diagram illustrating the formation of a real, inverted, and smaller image by a concave mirror. The object (O) is placed between the center of curvature (C) and the focal point (F). The image (I) is formed between C and F.

2
any
into the hole?



3

4

In the words of A.N. Whitehead:

"I logically accept what is
given as what veritably is.
Thus it is given; this must
it be taken. What we
deal with under the old
mistaken expression 'pro-
positional objects' are continu-
ous, & which 'non-data' —
verbal 'non-data' pre-
eminently — are the given stuff
& the only stuff with which
we are acquainted."


The Concept of Nature

When I reach C my speed for A is at a maximum; for B it is nil. Who is right? Both, of course, are right.

A further objection occurs to common sense. The observer retiring from me shifts, from time to time, the direction of his gaze. First it is centred upon a molecule, or a cell, then upon a man, a planet, a solar system, a galaxy, ^{subsequently} & at each stage the direction of the new object changes, sometimes more & sometimes less, according to the eccentricity of the previous object. (For instance, if the cell chosen is in my ^{left} hand, the observer will, when I the man come into view, turn slightly to the my right. The ~~same~~ ^{principle} ~~applies~~ ^{is repeated} at every stage.) But if this is so, the observer can no longer be said to be my observer: he has allowed his attention to be diverted from me.

My reply is that: so far from the ^{my} shifting of the observer's attention from one centre to another is a fact; but it is a fact which, far from disproving ~~the distance~~ ^{my position}, lends it valuable support. My observer sees ~~me~~ truly when his ~~own~~ observations force him from the centre of the part to the centre of the whole, & again to the centre of a still more inclusive whole. For that is precisely my own experience. When I abandon, for the time being, my private interest, & identify myself with my ^{distinct} ~~own~~ country, I do, in fact, transfer my allegiance; I acknowledge the new headquarters, & the larger the unit the more remote the headquarters are likely to be. But (as common sense is quick to point out) I may happen to be ^{stationed} at headquarters; sometimes I do not have this ~~feeling~~ ^{sense} of reliance upon a remote centre, but seem to be at the very heart of that larger whole that commands my loyalty. Again, I reply, ~~my~~ observer if my observer is sufficiently observant, he will see me truly for he can move so as to bring my centres into line, making them (from his angle) coincident. Whether he sees the molecule or cell or man as the offshoot of larger units, or ~~being~~ ^{encased} within them, he sees aright: man is at once at the very hub of the world, and at the rim. To ignore either aspect is to misunderstand his nature.

C. But the man, to ~~maintain~~ ^{note that} the overcome the ~~objection~~ ^{objection}, has to shift centre. Which brings me to one of my main objections to the doctrine of this chapter. The observer retiring from me ~~does not play fair~~ ^{is dishonest}, for he shifts, from




Observer B turns to his left each time the larger unit comes into view. Observer A keeps the new centre in line with the old.

Observer A's view, with man at the centre.

* Bruno, Nietzsche

For C. I think
it is A. in fact
that is the main
objection. The
main objection
is that the
observer is
not playing fair.



...the observer is not playing fair... the observer is not playing fair... the observer is not playing fair...

+ This fact has often been noted, for example in

object, but the observation of certain changes in the object? What is this 'distance' which common sense is so sure is something? My observer cannot see it: he observes only me, and I am as open to his inspection at thirty billion miles as at thirty inches. It ~~is as if~~ ^{is as if} nothing intervened. ~~is distance then a sort of principle of non-intervention?~~ For something that comes between things, ^{distance} is singularly unobtrusive, self-effacing. * But my observer does not speculate about anything so elusive. What he is sure of is that first there was a man, then a series of remarkable transformations, & in the end Space, thinly shown.

"Empty space - space without some quality (visual or muscular) which in itself is more than spatial - is an unusual abstraction. It cannot be said to exist."
F.H. Bradley: Appearance & Reality, p. 58.

* That distance is inferred and not seen is Berkeley's ~~point~~ point in the first part of his New Theory of Vision. See Bertrand Russell's Outline of Philosophy, p. 145, also.

But Common sense, constrained by science, cannot altogether reject the observer's picture of me. This is particularly true of the near view. ~~Common sense~~ ^{will} hardly ~~be~~ ^{be} denied, for instance, that I am atoms. Why then reject the far view, and deny that I am the Solar System? Atoms and Solar Systems have a good deal in common, and they are equally unlike the common-sense version of what I am. Surely it is ~~unreasonable~~ ^{unreasonable} to accept the one & reject the other. Doubtless common sense will ~~come back with the report~~ ^{my observer might be} that the Solar System includes so much that is not me. ~~tempted to reply~~ ^{tempted to reply} that the atom excludes so much that is me, & the sin of omission is as great as its opposite. But that would be to fall into the trap that common sense is always setting: it would be to allow a preconceived notion of what I really am to get between the observer & ^{me} his object. So far, his report is this - I am not a man who is more than atoms & less than the Solar System, but I am, in some queer fashion not yet revealed, atoms, and man, and Solar System, and a great deal besides.



AA represents that part of the Solar System which (according to common sense) is not me.

BB represents those atoms, molecules, etc. which the near view of me leaves out.

Is there no distinction then, common sense inquires, between what a thing really is, & its appearance? * Can I not ~~be~~ ^{be} seen different from different places, yet be the same?

+ "Out of all the visual magnitudes of each known object we have selected one as the 'real one' to think of, & degraded all the others to serve as mere signs. This real magnitude is determined by... practical interests."
William James: Textbook of Psychology, p. 344.

No doubt I can, but which is the true me & which the appearance? What shall guide my choice? Accident, convenience, or some more august principle? I am the victim of my own prejudices. All I can say is that my instinct is to call true that View of myself which integrates all partial views, from electron to universe. Within this one synthetic portrait every partial perspective is valid, & indispensable, ^{while} amongst them special emphasis must be placed upon the view from the middle distance, the view that is neither very far nor very near.

The sphere is like the shape of the object



What is the point at issue? Common sense has to admit that, even when my observer sees me as a man, he sees only a part of me, & that the way to see ~~the man~~ ^{more} is to move. Common sense proposes circular motion about me, ^{plus} ~~plus~~ ^{approaching} radial motion of science. Uncommon sense proposes these ~~plus~~ ^{plus} receding radial motion. A man (sup uncommon man) is a partial view of something more, & all these ways of investigating that something more are useful.

"Our experiences of the apparent world are nature itself."
A.N. Whitehead: Principles of Natural Knowledge
"Nature is nothing else than the deliverance of sense-awareness."
A.N. Whitehead: The Concept of Nature, p. 155

1. The first part of the paper is devoted to a general discussion of the problem of the existence of a solution of the system of equations (1) for arbitrary values of the parameters α and β . It is shown that the system has a solution for arbitrary values of the parameters α and β if and only if the condition $\alpha + \beta = 1$ is satisfied.

The following is a list of the
 specimens in the collection of the
 U. S. National Museum, Washington, D. C.
 which were obtained from the
 U. S. Fish Commission, Washington, D. C.
 during the year 1900.

July 18th Sunday AA
Wrote letters & cards to
(and moved to church)
and then to
the school & church
in the afternoon
went over to see mother

[illegible]


A circular diagram with concentric rings and radial lines, resembling a target or a celestial map. The diagram is divided into several concentric circles, with radial lines extending from the center to the outer edge. The center of the diagram is marked with a small circle containing a cross. The radial lines are labeled with letters: 'A' at the top, 'B' at the top-right, 'C' at the right, 'D' at the bottom-right, 'E' at the bottom, 'F' at the bottom-left, 'G' at the left, and 'H' at the top-left. The diagram is drawn on a piece of paper with a grid pattern.

A. E. T. p78
Anastasia

A. E. T. p78
Anastasia

+ This fact has often been noted, for example in


* Go, consider a picture. Where is it?
 At A? No, here are only electrons, atoms, molecules, particles of paint.
 At B? No, here are found only tiny parts of the picture.
 At D? Here the picture as a whole can be viewed.




Let the picture be not simply at D. All regions from A to D, & from D outwards are necessary to the existence of D, & of the real picture.

Thoreau, 'Many an unknown noise, go a long way off, is heard as music, a proud novel nation on the meanness of our lives' (Walden: Higher Law). Which is the more 'real' - the noise or the music? The answer is that both are manifestations of a third central reality which is neither noise nor musical.

© The two ways of observing are well illustrated by the two main branches of psychology, one endeavoring to observe the organism, & the other to observe with the organism. All social life, with its moral & psychological judgments, means the constantly ~~extension of the self~~ both adopting both views.



When we ask why a person behaves so, we inquire about the person's 'view-out'. On this subject see Wm M. Duggan: Psychology pp 42, 66.



* Paradoxically, the reason I have no head is that I am a head, & the reason I have a hand is that I am not a hand. I am here in the region where my hand (in itself nothing) becomes a hand.



My observer - who is really a part of myself - starts off with the fact that I am a 'mere' man; then, having by travel discovered that I am also far less & far more than a man, returns to this human base with a sense of home-coming. This human sphere is my own place. But - and this is the vital point - I am what I am from every place, & am really no more a 'mere' man than a 'mere' fingernail. * It takes every sphere of me to sustain the sphere of my choice. The non-human aspects of me are the consolidation of the human, & to be what common sense says I am is to be what common sense declares I cannot be.

8. The View Inwards and the View Outwards Brought Together.

I have now filled in some of the details of the two portraits. At first the one contradicted the other; in fact it was precisely what the other was not - what have a bodiless head & a headless body in common except their need of each other? But fundamental likenesses have now been brought out. ~~Looking at me & looking with me~~ ^{both} come to much the same thing. © ~~facts of~~ the two portraits have one ground-plan. This is a series of spheres, based on a common centre, & embracing the world. (It will be my task in the Second Part II of this book to try to define these spheres more precisely. For the present I have indicated some of them, ranging from the electron region very near to the centre to the ^{relatively} ~~thinnest~~ region very far away from it, with the human region somewhere, between.)

Now the two portraits involve precisely the same spheres or regions, but put them to different uses. Looking outwards, I conceive the spheres to be the home addresses of the miscellaneous ^{comprising} objects which I group here. Looking inwards, I conceive ^{the spheres} them to be a series of observation-posts for inspecting what lies at their centre. In short, there is two-way traffic between centre & circumference. The outward movement is the business of myself as I am to myself, the inward of myself as I am to my observers.

And then is the other very obvious difference: the view inwards reveals me & mine - ^{my human body,} ~~my~~ ^{my} ~~cells,~~ ^{cells,} ~~my~~ ^{my} ~~head,~~ ^{head,} ~~my~~ ^{my} ~~house,~~ ^{house,} ~~my~~ ^{my} ~~planet~~ ^{planet} - whereas the view outwards reveals the other - the other man's ~~cells,~~ ^{the other man's body,} ~~head,~~ ^{head,} ~~the other~~ ^{the other} ~~house,~~ ^{house,} ~~the other~~ ^{the other} ~~planet.~~ ^{planet.} Of course I see parts of my body & my house & my planet (all allocated to their proper spheres) but ~~never~~ ^{do not} see these things whole. * That is because I lie here in the middle of them, where all other men but this man, all other planets but this planet,

* The universe declares in 3 ways, says a Frenchman, 'the proportion we are due to know it'.

are open to inspection. The centrifugal picture completes the centrifugal. So far from contradicting one another, the two portraits demand one another. The right way to discover what I am is to look outwards and inwards at the same time.

Let me ^{then} try facing both ways. I have already recorded the observer's impression of me: what about my impression of him? Suppose I am watching him as carefully as he is watching ~~to~~ me here at my desk. We start off very close, then draw apart. We experience one another as heads, then as men. Provided conditions are favourable, when he has got to the next town across the valley he is for me that town, just as I am for him this town. If we are anything at all to one another we ~~appear~~ ^{appear} no longer as a pair of humans, but ^{as} a pair of towns. He continues his journey, & presently gets to the moon. We are now a pair of heavenly bodies to each other. And so the story goes on: when he sees me as a Star (that is, as the Sun with her planets) he is a Star to me, and, in the end, we turn into a pair of Universes.

If, instead of retreating from each other, we had approached, our findings would have been in principle the same. However near, however far, we are always equal: that is the great Law. ^{The more I find in things, the more I have in me.} I only deal with individuals of my own rank. I adjust my status as each occasion requires. I am like a man who, to avoid offending any, is all things to all men, simple to the simple, great to the great, learned to the learned; or like a king travelling incognito, who adopts the appearance & manners of the men he happens to be among. If I am in the place where my observer is human, he is in the place where I am human. My centre, my here, lies in his human sphere or region, as his lies in mine. If I am centred in the place where he is molecules, he is centred where I am molecules. Only stars see stars: men cannot see them. ^{a cat cannot look at a king.}

as it takes a poet to know a poet, so it takes a man to know a man. "You can only behold that which you are," said Weldon Underhills. "Only the Real can know Reality." The doctrine of Equality is no mere political slogan, but is rooted deep in the nature of things. ~~Att seeing is looking into a mirror, & what I am is~~ always staring myself in the face. What I fail to see in things is not necessarily absent from them: more likely it is absent from me, & that is ~~why~~ the reason for my blindness. I see what I bring to my seeing.


Of course this is an over-simplification, & I shall have to qualify and elaborate later on. Meantime the principle is clear: if I do not literally see myself in things, at least I see my equivalent, a sample of myself. All my looking is looking in a mirror — in a mirror which has the trick of showing me, not this face, but my other very similar faces,

"The universe slumbers in the soul," says W. Macnail Dixon, "in proportion as we come to know it we come to know ourselves." ^{© The Human Situation, p. 70.}

At every level I know myself in terms of my colleagues at that level. The words of the Tao Te Ching are literally correct:—
'For this it is that in yourself you see other selves, in your family you see other families, in your district you see other districts, in your country you see other countries....'
And the Bhagavat Gita says that the sage "beholds himself in all beings, & all beings in himself."



+ Cf. John III, 3. "We know that... we shall be like Him; for we shall see Him even as He is." & the doctrine of Heraclitus that a man recognises Fire by the ~~fire~~ fiery element in himself, Water by the watery element, & so on.



• Mythicism, p.

The saying of Plotinus (based on the noted passage in Plato's Republic) that the eye cannot behold the sun unless it be sun-like, is almost literally true.

Objects are so far from diminishing, that they magnify the faculties of the soul beholding them. A sand in your conception conformeth your soul, & reduceth it to the size & similitude of a sand. A tree apprehended is a tree in your mind; the whole hemisphere & the heavens magnify your soul to the widthness of the heavens; all the spaces above the heavens enlarge it wider to their own dimensions. ^{Plotinus: Enneads 4, med}

+ This fact has often been noted, for example in
 + That rather curious passage of Marcus
 Aurelius, in which he grades things according
 to what they appear: the common people
 are interested in material things, men of good
 a higher grade of people in animal things, as flocks & herds; a higher still
 in men as skilled in arts & crafts; the best people in men as reasonable
 souls. (Meditations VI, XIII.)

- or even alive. + Unfortunately my arm is too
 short and my hand-mirror too small: I cannot hold it out there in
 space beyond my human region, to discover what I am there. Nor can I
 inquire of the stars and planets their opinion of me. If I could, I would not
 have need to call in an observer, and my Earth-hood and Stars-hood
 would be as evident and as unsurprising as my manhood. Instead I
 must make do with simple sight - that ^{different} sort of mirror which
 tells me in terms of others what I am.



I, at A, am where
 the star is a star, the
 planet is a planet &
 so on. These things
 are not stars, planets
 so at the centers of
 their spheres.

* "No physical 'expansion'
 can alter the fact that the
 self is what it appears to
 be." W.E. Hocking: The Self,
 the body & freedom, p. 8.

9. The Elastic Self.

At this point I find myself arguing with myself thus:

Common Sense: When I stop looking at a star to attend to a speck of
 dust on the window-pane, the changes I detect in myself are trivial. If
 I am what I seem to myself to be, I remain a man. My objects may
 swell and shrink, I do not. My there is elastic, my here constant.

Uncommon Sense: Consider this word here. What do I mean by it? When
 I tell my dog to come here, I want him to come to where I am standing;
 when a football team comes here, it comes to this town; when a
 foreigner comes here, he comes to this country; if Martians were to
 invade the Earth I should say they had arrived here, ^{even though they would alight in Australia.} In fact my
here is infinitely elastic, swelling to gigantic proportions, and shrink-
 ing again to next to nothing in an instant. It always keeps pace with my
there.



C.S.: But this is very likely a verbal difficulty, a defect in our language.

U.S.: Our language is generally wiser than its critics, & in this instance it
 certainly is. Do I not identify myself with my elastic here? A
 single conversation may find me taking up the viewpoint of my 'me'
 human self, of my family, of my nation, of my race, & of my
 planet, successively. + "Let the Human Organ be kept in their perfect integrity," says
 Blake, "it will Contracting into Worms or Expanding into Gods."

C.S.: It is a theoretical identification, no more.

U.S.: How is it then that I take to myself so unquestioningly the
 praise, resent the blame, suffer the pains, & enjoy the triumphs, which
 which belong to these more inclusive things? Not only am I always
 thinking & speaking for them, but feeling for them - or, rather, thinking and
 speaking and feeling as them. The truth is that my 'body' (by which I mean
 that part of the world in which I am, for the time-being, ubiquitous) is just as
 elastic as my 'mind' (by which I mean that part of the world which I
 am 'up against' or definitely excluded).




My here is what I, more
 or less unconsciously, feel
 I have behind me when I
 am dealing with an object
 there. It is the 'backing' I
 assume to be mine, and
 it is on a par with what I
 am 'facing'.

+ human soul
 must rise from individual to the whole.
 Self-love but serves its virtuous mind to wake,
 as the small pebble stirs the peaceful lake;
 The centre moved, a circle straight succeeds;
 Another still, and still another spreads;
 Friend, parent, neighbour, first with it embrace;
 His country next; & next all human race;
 Wide & more wide, the overflowings of the mind
 Take every creature in, of every kind.

Pope: Essay on Man.

...the ... of ...
 ...the ... of ...
 ...the ... of ...
 ...the ... of ...
 ...the ... of ...



under ... A ...
 ...the ... of ...
 ...the ... of ...
 ...the ... of ...



...the ... of ...
 ...the ... of ...
 ...the ... of ...
 ...the ... of ...
 ...the ... of ...

Begin here:

...the ... of ...

6. to change the figure, let me put the situation this way. Every successive garment I wrap around myself is a cloak of nothingness: when I wear it, I incorporate it in my own non-existence; I abolish it, along with the rest of me. The way of escape is to get inside the menacing object; become myself. it is no more the way of all the rest of me. * In this fashion I can take on the Earth, the Solar System, the Galaxy itself: pull myself at the centre & bring it to naught. How do I do this? There is only one way, & that is, occupying myself with the other individuals, my colleagues - planets, stars, galaxies - at every level. It is for this that I make myself nothing, that they may be themselves in me.

* This is beautifully illustrated by Newton's hollow sphere. A man on the outside of it is subject to its gravitational pull; once he goes inside, the pull ceases, - it is now for him as if the sphere did not exist. He would not fall through the bottom; A does not pull him harder than B, because the greater mass of A is offset by its greater distance.



P, Q, R are for me nothing:
 This place is taken by P', Q', R'.

This is all far too vague, far too much a matter of feeling, unscientifically, to be taken seriously. The danger of subjectivity is that we find what we look for. If there were objective evidence, that I can multiply an object, that by putting a self inside it, the rest of the scene can be recognized, that an object can be multiplied by placing self inside it & interpreting.

How I can multiply the effect of an object by placing it from here to here.

Philom
Nov 4
17251

World, p. 88

+ Wheechote: Aphorisms, 716

the
* Scientists, wrapped up in the object & overlooking
the observer, is per excellence the equal of
his object. But this is no reason why he should
not also, qua philosopher, realize this equality.
It is often said (e.g. Wm. James, The Will to Believe
pp 97 ff) that there are two kinds of world view -
the naive, which ignores ~~these~~ world views, & the
philosophical, which allows for ~~him~~ & includes
him. The difference between these, in accordance with
the laws of equality, is very great indeed. It
takes a class to observe a class, that is a
most important fact about the nature of class.

+ the saying of St. John of the Cross, that
the soul lives in + by that which it
loves ~~not in the~~ rather than in
the body, is no figure of speech, but
plain truth. Cardinal Bérulle
says of man: "He is a nothingness surrounded
by God, indigent of God, capable of God,
filled with God, if he so
wishes."
is it in ^{his} ~~God's~~ ^{own} ~~God's~~ ^{will}

the moment my attention wanders ~~from~~ to myself
& my equality with my object, the spell is broken; &
sinks to a lower level;

1. The first is the fact that the
 2. second is the fact that the
 3. third is the fact that the
 4. fourth is the fact that the
 5. fifth is the fact that the
 6. sixth is the fact that the
 7. seventh is the fact that the
 8. eighth is the fact that the
 9. ninth is the fact that the
 10. tenth is the fact that the



1. Introduction & background of the business
 2. Analysis of the business & its environment
 3. Identification of the business & its environment
 4. Analysis of the business & its environment
 5. Identification of the business & its environment
 6. Analysis of the business & its environment
 7. Identification of the business & its environment
 8. Analysis of the business & its environment
 9. Identification of the business & its environment
 10. Analysis of the business & its environment

[illegible]

It is well to
make a copy

+ C.S. Could not depth be as objectively real as height + breadth, in spite of its being less evident?

vs. What is being objectively real ~~but~~ if not being evident to someone sometimes ^{at all events} that is a big question that must wait ^{to turn} for an answer. It is quite clear that I do not share responsibility for my object's shape to the same degree that I share responsibility for its range: if I do not actively put distance between us, making myself + it scarce, at least I am party to that deed. Its range is really our range, but its height in a sense in which its height is not our height.

~~I~~ I ^{attempt to} fix my eye on the window pane, or too the stars beyond, as I please, & they ^{is no} ~~they~~ ^{or distance} ~~forbearance~~ return them.

11. Conclusion

This book is a self-portrait, the portrait of a man. There are two methods of making a portrait: the first — it is the wrong way — is to pick on an eye and draw it in meticulously, then go on to the mouth and do the same, and so on, ^{with every feature}. The second is ruthlessly to suppress all details & block in only the main shapes, in the midst of which eyes & mouth will in due time appear; ^{then} from start to finish the whole is given, & each stage is nothing but a correction of the erroneous — but necessarily erroneous — generalisations of the previous stage. The one method aims at exactness from the beginning & fails in the end, while the other achieves some success by realising that exactness belongs not at the beginning (where it is a nuisance) but at the end (when it is an unattainable ideal).



It is the second of these methods that I am trying to follow here. What I have written in this chapter serves as a kind of scaffolding for ^{the chapter} ~~what~~ to follow — a scaffolding which reveals some of the broad outlines of the plan, but which in ^{many of} its details is destined to disappear. ^{A number of} ~~many~~ questions have been dealt with cavalierly; more have been left out altogether. Thus I have ignored all the senses but sight; I have left unexamined the paradox of the mirror (if I am when my mirror is me-as-a-man, have I another centre or here in the mirror?); I have been intentionally vague about the 'spheres' or 'regions'; I have left many seeming exceptions to the system unaccounted for. In particular, the portrait I have sketched suggests a passive, theoretical contemplation of static 'presentations', whereas ^{a man is much more than this; in reality he is purposeful,} ~~and really complex~~ dynamic, practical. * The explanation is that this chapter maps out roughly the field on which the practical, ^{fully-blooded} issues are fought out. The more involved ~~the~~ the battle, the more the observer has need of landmarks.

* This question is taken up again in Ch. 2a §5.

The rest of the book can be left to amplify and correct the first sketch. What concerns me at the moment is the question of realisation. I find in myself two ^{tendencies} ~~tendencies~~ which war against a vivid appreciation of a thing or an idea — too ready an acceptance, in which I swallow the thing whole & there is no time to taste it, and too ready a rejection, in which I spit the thing out before it has had a chance to prove itself upon my palate. To be human is strange; so strange that when I do momentarily grasp the wonder of it I cannot think how I ever came to take ^{my condition} ~~it~~ for granted. Even as I write this down the act of writing destroys the wonder. What am I? What is this wildly improbable fact

of man? Are the answers I have sketched commonplace, not particularly exciting? Then I am already half dead. Are they 'six impossible things before breakfast'? ~~possible~~ impossible? Then, though I am not yet fully alive, there is hope for me. For I may be sure I am in reality far more fantastic than any mere portrait of myself. And even nonsense, if it jerks me out of self-complacency, is no longer nonsense.

Actually, the philosopher, who thinks
with the experience of a rebel
is more important than the scientist
who thinks the object is things
are independent of the experience
subject & the data is just part
of a given ~~totality~~ totality of facts.
But I don't search for
truth with that firm conviction as a
man of self-knowledge with interest
& responsibility not confined to the material
plane, one put so much facing the hard
fact of experience as those who start from
consciousness as a chance for making the
indeterminacies of "phenomena" & "essences".
(See the Wells & de Physique World, pp 208, 209)
"The highest world," says Bradley, "whether it
exists independently or not, is, for each of us, an
absorption from the actual reality."
Coleridge & Kierkegaard, p. 261.
* Actually, the truly philosophical approach,
though as little as possible for granted, is
that which begins with the idea of a post-
experience rather than with causality.



1905
as a little
and no
to
small
part of
being
on how
many degrees
of being
being
being

1. WHAT AM I? ~~The Missing Head~~

What am I? That, for every thinking being, is the question. Let me then try to answer it as truly and simply as I can. I shall try to forget the ready-made answers, and to discover what I am to myself at this moment.

My common sense tells me that I am a man very much like other men, five-feet-ten tall, thirty-eight years old, weighing about eleven stone, and that I am now sitting at my desk writing ~~a book about myself~~. Common sense isn't concerned with philosophical subtleties, but is quite certain what it is like, here and now, to be me, writing on this sheet of paper.

2. THE MISSING HEAD.

So far, surely, ~~I cannot~~ ^{nothing can} have gone wrong. But has common sense ~~really described what it is like to be me?~~ ^{really described} ~~What is it like, at this moment?~~ Others cannot help here: only I am in a position to say what I am. And what I find is that common sense is utterly wrong in supposing that I am much like other men. For I have no head! There on the desk are my hands; there are the sleeves of my jacket; between them are hazy areas of my ~~jacket~~ ^{jacket and tie}; if I look under the desk I shall find my feet, encased in their shoes -- but what has become of my head? It is missing. I am headless. And I had never noticed the fact!

What is ~~there~~ ^{grants} in place of my head? Let me attend, carefully, and with an open mind, to what I may find. I find that there are, instead of my head, writing paper, a fountain-pen, an ink-bottle, the carpet and chairs and walls of the room, the lime trees and houses outside the window, the cloudy sky above them. My head has gone, and in its place is this ~~very~~ ^{different} collection of objects.

It seems that to be me is to be unique, the one man on Earth (surely the one creature in the Universe) who is built on this ~~amazing~~ ^{amazing} plan: where the rest carry small rounded body-terminals, furnished with hair and eyes and mouth, and fairly constant in shape, there is for me a boundless and lively world. I alone have a body that fades out so that the only hints that remain of it above my shoulders are a pair of transparent shadows thrown across the world. (I am in the habit of calling the shadows 'my nose', but ~~is~~ ^{is} a nose, a fuzzy thing one can see through, that is quite detached from any face, that can be swung from side to side almost as if it were a trunk! If this is a nose, then I have one (or a pair -- two) of them; if it is not, then I have no nose.)

Common sense suggests a simple explanation: the reason I cannot see my head is not that I lack one, but that I am looking out of it. A man cannot look out of the window of his house at the street, and at the same time see his own house with the window in it. This inability of his to face both ways, however, surely does not mean that he has no house. ~~In principle, the same thing, the reason I cannot find my head is not that I lack one, but that I am looking out of it.~~

Is this explanation good enough? Where am I, where do I actually spend my time? Do I live inside an eight-inch ball, peering through its pair of port-holes? And if I do, has the ball's tenant eyes in his head also, and a still tinier tenant who peers through them? And so on indefinitely?

No. It is certain I am not shut up in the gloomy interior of any object, and least of all in a rather small tightly-packed sphere, somehow managing to live my life there in its interstices. I am at large in the world. I can discover no watcher here, and over there a thing watched, no peep-hole out into the world, no window-pane, no barrier, no frontier. I do not detect a world: it lies wide open to me. At this moment ink marks are forming on this sheet of paper. They are present. There is nothing else now but this paper, this blue and white pattern, no screen here (where I imagined I had a head) upon which the pattern is projected, no aperture through which it is glimpsed. There ~~is~~ ^{are} only the paper and the pattern. My head, eyes, brain -- all are a fiction. It is incredible that I ever believed in them.

How is it that for thirty years and more I had never noticed that between myself and other men there is literally a world of difference? A discrepancy, so startling, once it is seen, ought to have been evident every second of my life from early childhood onwards. But in fact even now I realise it with difficulty, and only for a moment at a time. Then back I am again in my old habit, seeing myself as others see me, and as blind as ever I was to the obvious truth that I alone amongst men carry no head upon my shoulders, that I am another species of animal, another order, another class altogether, right outside the entire animal kingdom in a realm all my own. I am as unlike this thing with a head that ~~is~~ ^{is} called a man, as it is possible to be. To give the same name to two such different beings is the grossest misuse of language imaginable. I have been properly taken in, and by nobody else but myself. What reason can I have for thus suppressing the facts about what I really am?

But I inhabit a house of flesh & blood, & look out upon the world through its ~~solid~~ ^{solid} wall?

3. THE HEAD FOUND.

Common sense cannot let this portrait of myself as a headless body pass. Agreed that there are big differences between myself as I am to myself and myself as I am to others, it remains a fact that in neither case can I do without a head. Or, if I can, what is a headache? And where do all the sensations belong that go with the play of the muscles of my eyes and tongue and face, if not in my head? What does my voice issue from? What do my hands feed?

No doubt common sense is right thus far -- that something is going on where I thought I had a head. It is equally certain that this something is not a head. Whatever they are and wherever they are, these aches and tastes, and sensations of warmth and cold and pressure, are not furnished with hair and eyes and ears. They are not spherical or eight inches across. They are utterly different from the dictionary definition of a head.

But I can always reassure myself (common sense replies) by looking in a mirror.

So I have found my lost head, not here, where I thought it belonged on my shoulders, but over there in the mirror, and in every reflecting surface within range. Thus, while I have no head at all where I ought to have one, I have innumerable heads in places where I ought to have none. What is more, these heads have apparently been tampered with: they are twisted back to front; they are all smaller than the head I thought I had; they shrink and swell unaccountably. I am a decapitated body watched from the middle distance by its missing head, now made elastic, turned round to face its own trunk, and multiplied times without number.

It is true, of course, that I cannot find the missing head wherever I look, but that seems to be because it is concealed rather than absent. If I give the thing I happen to be looking at a polish, there is my head in it. I can only suppose it was somehow there all the time, and that the polishing brought it out. (Is not this, perhaps, in addition to the over-worked Freudian explanation, the point of the story of Aladdin and his Wonderful Lamp? And are not we who, unlike Aladdin, find no magic in its polished and reflecting surface, the victims of a profounder hallucination than his?)

Common sense interrupts here to inquire about objects that will not take a polish.

Well, a man is such an object. And he will prove to me, in words or in sketches if need be, that he no less than my mirror has my features in their minutest detail, with all their subtle and momentary changes of expression. He has them where he is; concealed from me, they are open and evident to him. In fact, the face with which he confronts me is a mask for mine. He cannot take off this mask, but he can tell me what it hides.

Common sense has a further objection. These things that either mirror or are alive are special cases. The rest, dull and dead things, hide no missing heads. Consider this sheet of paper on which I am now writing: does it contain my head?

Certainly it does. But it contains much else besides. If I can keep out most of these other irrelevant things by putting a box, with a small hole in it, over the paper, then my head will appear. Now all I have done to the paper is to shield it. I have revealed the presence of my head by subtracting from the paper's condition, not by adding anything to it. Why then should I not say that my head was there all the time, blurred by the other things that were there along with it? Make a hole in any box, and you have my head trapped inside -- a head perfectly formed, though very likely no bigger than a pea. And remember that your camera is unlikely to play tricks. It is honest about what of me it contains. It cannot be credited with the power of grasping what is going on elsewhere; it reveals what is happening in the place where it is. If it could report about the place I call here it would, as a camera, be a failure, because its photographs of me would show me beheaded, with a camera mounted on my shoulders.

(Actually, there is such a camera, whose business is to report what the world is like to the human observer. When the device, known in the film industry as the first-person camera, is used, the audience sees, not the principal actor, but what he sees. An excellent example was the scene in the film Mine Own Executioner, where the hero is dragged along the ground by his legs; the audience is shown exactly what he would see -- his legs and at times his hands and arms, but not his head. The body with which the audience is to identify itself is headless. The effect is startling in its realism, but very few cinema-goers are aware of how it is achieved. In the film studio, either a headless dummy is used, with the camera placed where the head should be, or the camera has to be mounted as near as possible to the living subject's head, and facing the way he faces.)

Common sense is a universal phenomenon. This business of flying heads & headless bodies, though incompatible with common sense, is a part of common knowledge. A deeper & disquieting wisdom grasps the essential truth. Thus, according to a work of the fourth century A.D., there lived in the south of China a people whose heads could detach themselves from their bodies, & using the hands for wings, could fly to great distances. The tale is told of a certain female slave whose head flew about in this fashion every night, returning to the trunk at dawn. Flying heads - often little, but vampiric - appear in the folklore of various cultures, & "men whose heads do grow beneath their shoulders" are prominent figures in outlandish parts of the world. Perhaps the medieval French poet & martyr who walked (wrote of white King Charles - as they did with) after his head had been cut off, was something of the unconscious realization that we are all